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Essay
Why Ratification of the U.N. Convention of the
Law of the Sea May Violate Article III of the U.S.
Constitution
Julian G. Ku
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States remains the most important seafaring
nation that is not a member of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Despite vigorous efforts by
both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. Senate has
continued to refuse to give consent to accession. Most of the
objections to U.S. membership are based on policy
disagreements.2
In addition to policy objections, opponents of ratification
have also offered constitutional objections to joining UNCLOS.
The first set of objections focuses on the authority created by
UNCLOS to manage undersea resources outside of the
jurisdiction of particular countries.3 Numerous opponents have

Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law,
Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. J.D., Yale Law School,
B.A., Yale University. The author would like to thank Jean Galbraith, Vicki
Jackson, and Samuel Estreicher for their comments on earlier versions of this
Essay.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Status of the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982, United Nations, https://treaties.un.org/pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6-a&chapter=21&lang=en
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
2. The Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing on Senate Treaty Document
103-39 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 13–14 (2012)
(statement of Steven Groves) [hereinafter Groves, Hearing on Senate Treaty
Document 103-39]. See generally Raul Pedrozo, Is It Time for the United States
to Join the Law of the Sea Convention?, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 151 (2010)
(explaining the Obama Administration’s support for U.S. ratification).
3. Groves, Hearing on Senate Treaty Document 103-39, supra note 2, at
30 (“Now, finally, this treaty has allowed for us, on a provisional basis, to
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also suggested that UNCLOS impermissibly authorizes an
international organization to tax United States citizens or
companies.4 The second set of objections relate to the
constitutionality of the treaty’s complex system of binding
dispute settlement.5
In general, the legal academy has not seriously considered
any of these constitutional objections to UNCLOS. Most prior
studies of UNCLOS have been devoted to analyzing issues of
international law and institutional design.6 Much of this
literature has also openly advocated for U.S. ratification of
UNCLOS. None have seriously reviewed or analyzed
constitutional objections.7
This Essay seeks to address this gap in the academic
literature by considering what I believe to be the most serious
constitutional problem with accession to UNCLOS: the
compulsory dispute settlement system. This work draws heavily
on two important U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the past ten
years that considered the constitutional issues raised in U.S.
participation in other analogous systems of international
participate and influence the work of various entities, such as the Commission
on the Limits on the Continental Shelf and the International Seabed Authority,
the body that regulates the exploration, development, exploration of
international areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as oil, gas, and nonliving
resources under the seabed and subsoil.”).
4. Id. at 16 (“Other critics have suggested that the convention gives the
United Nations the authority to levy some kind of global tax.”).
5. Id. at 10 (“I know some are concerned that the treaty’s provisions for
binding dispute settlement would impinge on our sovereignty.”).
6. See, e.g., A. O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
DRAFTING HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY (1987); UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1989).
See also NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE U.N. CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA (2005); CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION:
THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION. (Jon M. Van
Dyke ed., 1985); THE UNITED STATES AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION: THE CASE PRO & CON (George Galdorisi ed., 1994); John A. C.
Cartner & Q.C. Edgar Gold, Commentary in Reply to “Is It Time for the United
States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention,” 42 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 54
(2011).
7. See, e.g., John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea
Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2006); John Norton Moore, UNCLOS Key to Increasing
Navigational Freedom, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 459 (2008); Bernard H. Oxman,
United States Interests in the Law of the Sea Convention, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 167,
168 (1994). See Cartner & Gold, supra note 6, at 54; THE UNITED STATES AND
THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, supra note 6; CONSENSUS AND
CONFRONTATION, supra note 6.
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dispute settlement. In Medellín v. Texas and Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, the Supreme Court considered the impact of decisions
from the International Court of Justice, and its holdings strongly
suggest that there are meaningful constitutional limits on U.S.
participation in international courts and tribunals.8 While the
U.S. government has recognized the potential constitutional
issues created by one aspect of UNCLOS dispute settlement,9
this Essay will explain that its proposal for eliding these issues
is insufficient to completely resolve the constitutional problems
I will identify.
This Essay begins by offering background regarding the
system of dispute settlement created by UNCLOS. In Part II, the
work considers possible constitutional limits imposed on U.S.
participation with international courts as gleaned from recent
Supreme Court decisions as well as other important legal
historical research on U.S. participation in systems of
international adjudication in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The Essay goes on in Part III to argue that these
limits are most clearly exceeded by the treaty’s requirement that
U.S. courts give automatic enforcement to decisions of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber. Less clear, but non-trivial constitutional
questions are also raised by the power of other UNCLOS bodies
to issue compulsory orders binding on the United States. The
U.S. government’s strategy treating these provisions as non-selfexecuting alleviates, but does not completely solve these
constitutional problems. Of course, these constitutional
infirmities do not mean that the U.S. should never ratify
UNCLOS. Instead, supporters of U.S. ratification need to
frankly acknowledge these constitutional weaknesses and
propose a more serious way to resolve them.
8. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)) (“A non-self-executing
treaty . . . is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have
domestic effect of its own force. That understanding precludes the assertion that
Congress has implicitly authorized the President—acting on his own—to
achieve precisely the same result. We therefore conclude, given the absence of
congressional legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue here did
not ‘express[ly] or implied[ly]’ vest the President with the unilateral authority
to make them self-executing.”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360
(2006) (“We therefore conclude . . . that claims under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention may be subjected to the same procedural default rules that apply
generally to other federal law claims.”).
9. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 110-09, at 17
(2007) [hereinafter Senate Exec. Doc. 110-09].
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II. UNCLOS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 marked the conclusion of
one of the most ambitious and comprehensive efforts to create a
worldwide system of legal rules governing the world’s oceans and
undersea resources.10 The United States and numerous other
industrialized nations initially refused to sign UNCLOS and
were largely responsible for forcing a second round of
negotiations culminating in a slightly revised 1994 agreement.11
President Clinton signed the revised version of UNCLOS in
1996.12 Presidents Bush and Obama both submitted UNCLOS
to the Senate for its advice and consent, but the Senate has thus
far refused to move to consider the treaty.13
UNCLOS has numerous provisions governing questions as
diverse as the ‘rules of the road’ for ships traversing the high
seas, definitions of land and sea features, the determination of
maritime boundaries and economic zones built from those land
features, scientific research, management of living marine
resources, and development of natural resources drawn from the
sea-bed beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.14
Recognizing that UNCLOS regulates a wide and diverse set
of issues, the drafters of UNCLOS sought to create mechanisms
for states-parties to resolve disputes under the Convention
peacefully. In Section 1 of Part XV, UNCLOS encourages statesparties to resolve disputes through negotiations, inquiries,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, exchanges of views, or
judicial settlement.15 These traditional mechanisms of dispute
settlement are completely voluntary.16
However, the UNCLOS conference was not satisfied with

10. See Duff, supra note 7, at 1 (“As of August 26, 2005, there were 149
parties to [UNCLOS] . . . . For all the parties to the Convention virtually all
legal questions concerning the law of the sea are now governed by the
Convention.”).
11. Id. at 2.
12. See Senate Exec. Doc. 110-09, supra note 9, at 2–3.
13. Id. See also Sean Patrick Mahard, Blackwater’s New Battlefield:
Toward a Regulatory Regime in the United States for Privately Armed
Contractors Operating at Sea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 331, 344 (2014) (“In
the summer of 2012, thirty-four senators were staunchly against UNCLOS,
which makes reaching the sixty-seven votes required to ratify the treaty
impossible.”).
14. See UNCLOS art. 279–299.
15. Id. at art. 279–285.
16. Id.
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merely encouraging states-parties to settle their disputes
peacefully through voluntary settlement. If they cannot resolve
any disputes through conciliation or negotiations, states-parties
are required to submit “any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention . . . to the court
or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.”17
States-parties must choose one of four possible methods of
dispute resolution: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), an
arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII for disputes under
the Convention as a whole, or a special arbitral tribunal
established according to Annex VIII for disputes related to
fisheries and the marine environment.18 If a state does not
choose a method of dispute settlement, the state will be deemed
to have accepted arbitration under Annex VII.19
States-parties may also avail themselves of provisional
measures under UNCLOS. Once a dispute has been submitted
to one of the courts or arbitral tribunals authorized by UNCLOS,
that court or arbitral tribunal “may prescribe any provisional
measures which it considers appropriate under the
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to
the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment, pending the final decision.”20 In cases where an
arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted, the ITLOS or
Seabed Disputes Chamber may prescribe provisional
measures.21 Importantly, UNCLOS states that all parties to a
dispute “shall comply promptly with any provisional measures
prescribed under this article.”22
Indeed, despite the complexity of the dispute settlement
system and the various options for states-parties, UNCLOS
makes it clear that all forms of dispute settlement are binding.
As UNCLOS states in Article 296, “Any decision rendered by a
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be
final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the
dispute.”23 The use of mandatory language removes any doubt
as to whether rulings issued pursuant to dispute settlement
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at art. 286.
Id. at art. 287.
Id.
Id. at art. 290.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 296.
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system are binding.24
No matter what method for dispute resolution the statesparties choose under Article 287, all states-parties will be
deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber for questions concerning the sea-bed.25 Under
Article 187, all states-parties to UNCLOS must agree to have
disputes relating to the exploration and management of sea-bed
settled with finality.26 UNCLOS states-parties involved in a
dispute may also agree to separate arbitration of a sea-bed
dispute,27 but all other disputes fall within the exclusive domain
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.28
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber not only has jurisdiction for
all disputes between states-parties to the Convention, but it will
also have jurisdiction over disputes “between parties to a
contract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise,
state enterprises and natural or juridical persons.”29
This aspect of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber’s jurisdiction
makes it highly unusual as compared to the rest of the UNCLOS
system and to most international tribunals. For instance, the
ICJ’s jurisdiction is limited to nation-states,30 but individuals,
corporations, nation-states, and the international agency
managing the Sea-Bed (the Authority) are all given direct access
to the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.31
Interestingly, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has
jurisdiction over disputes between the Authority and private
companies regarding “the interpretation or application of a
relevant contract or a plan of work” or “acts or omissions of a
24. 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982, supra
note 6, at 82–84 n.2 (describing UNCLOS’ drafting history, “[e]mphasiz[ing] the
finality of decisions and the obligation of the parties to the dispute to comply
with them”).
25. See UNCLOS at art. 287.
26. Id. at art. 187.
27. Id. at art. 188.
28. Id. at art. 187 (“The seabed disputes chamber shall have jurisdiction
under this Part and the Annexes relating thereto in disputes with respect to
activities in the Area falling within the following categories: . . . (f) any other
disputes for which the jurisdiction of the Chamber is specifically provided in
this Convention.”).
29. Id.
30. U.N. Charter art. 92–96 (noting that the Statute of the ICJ is annexed
to and functions “[i]n accordance with” Article 92 of the UN Charter); Statute
of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, T. S. No. 993 (1945)
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
31. UNCLOS art. 187.
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Party to the contract” relating to activities in the international
seabed area beyond national jurisdictions (called the “Area” by
UNCLOS).32 Such private companies can initiate proceedings
against the Authority whether or not they are sponsored by a
state-party to the Convention.33
Unlike the other methods of dispute settlement, UNCLOS
has specific provisions for the enforcement of Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber judgments. Not only are decisions of the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber binding on parties before the Chamber, but
Article 39 of Annex VI states, “[D]ecisions of the Chamber shall
be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same
manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State
Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought.”34
It is perhaps not surprising, however, that the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber’s judgments have this status given the
involvement of private companies in actions before the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber. Presumably, this provision would prevent
private parties from seeking to have national courts question the
decisions of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. This provision, as I
will discuss infra, imposes a broad obligation for domestic
enforcement of the Chamber’s decisions. This “enforcement”
clause raises the most serious constitutional issues for U.S.
accession to UNCLOS.
Finally, it is worth noting that ITLOS’s jurisdiction is also
not limited to disputes between states. Article 20 of the ITLOS
Statute “shall be open to entities other than States Parties”
where any other agreement conferred jurisdiction on ITLOS.35
This means that ITLOS may potentially hear disputes on legal
questions beyond the interpretation or application of the
Convention. Most importantly, it suggests that ITLOS could
acquire jurisdiction in “cases involving a private commercial
corporation or an intergovernmental organization, or even a
non-governmental organization, as a party.”36
In sum, UNCLOS creates a system of compulsory dispute
settlement where states-parties must choose one of four methods

32. Id. at (c).
33. Id.
34. UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex VI, art. 39.
35. Statute of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 20 § 2, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 566.
36. Thomas A. Mensah, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 307, 321
(1998).
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of international adjudication. Each of these adjudicatory options
results in a binding judgment which states-parties are obligated
to comply with. All states-parties must accept the jurisdiction of
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for disputes related to the Area,
and this jurisdiction extends to non-state parties such as natural
persons and business enterprises. Moreover, UNCLOS makes
judgments of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber enforceable in the
domestic legal systems of states-parties as if those judgments
were those of the highest domestic court.
III. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL
COURTS
Although the United States has participated in forms of
international dispute resolution since its founding,37 the
constitutional consequences of binding judgments issued by
international tribunals are rarely considered by scholars and
barely addressed by courts. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Medellín v. Texas,
most commentary on the constitutionality of U.S. participation
in international courts dismissed such concerns are largely
overblown.38 For instance, when I advocated for applying a clear
statement rule to mitigate or limit delegations to international
courts and tribunals, several commentators dismissed my
delegation concerns as mistaken or mere “myth.”39
However, the combination of those two Supreme Court
decisions and recent new historical research about
constitutional limits on the U.S. participation in slave-trade
tribunals and international prize courts has re-framed this
debate and highlighted the constitutional challenge posed by the
U.S. participation in international courts. International courts
will continue to play an important role in world affairs,40 and as
a result, constitutional limits on U.S. participation can and
should be defined.
37. See generally The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (the Jay
Treaty), U.S.–Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1795, 8 Stat. 116 (appointing five
commissioners to settle claims from the Revolutionary War).
38. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman and Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of
International Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693 (2008).
39. Compare Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 71 (2000), with Guzman, supra note 38, at 1697.
40. Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court
Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2006).
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ARTICLE III AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
1. Article III

The Constitution states that the “judicial power of the
United States” is vested in “one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”41 The judges in these courts exercising judicial power
must be appointed pursuant to the President’s nomination and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Those judges must
also be granted life tenure and receive other protections in order
to safeguard their political independence.42
Although the Constitution does not mention any other kind
of federal judicial body, U.S. history and practice have typically
allowed some kinds of legal disputes that would otherwise fall
within the scope of the Article III federal judicial power to be
resolved by other kinds of courts or tribunals.43 Despite this
permissive approach, judicial interpretations of Article III have
nonetheless maintained limitations on the allocation of
jurisdiction to non-Article III courts.
Thus, although there is some precedent for non-Article III
courts in early U.S. history with the establishment of territorial
tribunals, courts-martial, and consular courts, the real growth
of Article III jurisprudence coincided with the rise of the
administrative state in the twentieth century.44 In the seminal
1932 decision of Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court upheld
the use of non-Article III administrative courts to determine
facts in cases.45 The Court noted that in most cases, such courts
were appropriately authorized to resolve disputes involving
“public rights,” or disputes asserting monetary claims against
the United States. The Crowell Court also opened the door to
allowing non-Article III courts to resolve even some “private
rights,” a category which includes most common law actions and
criminal prosecutions.46
While private rights may in some cases be allocated to a non41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., James Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 660–65 (2004)
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s Article III delegation jurisprudence).
44. Id.
45. 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
46. Id. at 47.
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Article III tribunal, other decisions have imposed strict limits.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., saw
the Court invalidate a portion of the Bankruptcy Act that
allowed non-Article III bankruptcy judges to decide state law
claims involving an estate.47 Other cases have required juries for
private rights cases pursuant to the Seventh Amendment,
further circumscribing non-Article III bodies.48 The scope of
these Article III limitations, however, remains unclear since the
Court permitted certain common law claims to be resolved by an
administrative agency in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor.49
The clearest approach to identifying Article III limits would
focus on requiring that Article III courts maintain appellate
review over the decisions of non-Article III tribunals.50 Not only
are state courts subject to Article III appellate review for federal
issues, but non-Article III tribunals, including administrative
tribunals, are subject to various forms of appellate review in the
federal courts. It is likely (although the Court has never ruled so
explicitly), that retaining appellate review in an Article III court
should satisfy concerns about the delegation of the federal
judicial power to non-Article III tribunals.51 As a historical
matter, at least, scholars have argued that even though
Congress has created non-Article III courts and tribunals, such
judicial bodies always remained within the supervisory
jurisdiction of federal courts.52
In sum, the Supreme Court has maintained limitations on
the kinds of disputes that can be delegated to non-Article III
tribunals, favoring the delegation of judicial power over public
rights rather than private rights. These limitations, however,
have not been consistently applied. In any event, scholarly and
historical practice supports maintaining at least some form of

47. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
48. Granfianciera, S.A. et al. v. Nordbeg, 492 U.S. 33, 61, 64 (1989).
49. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
50. This approach has received much support in the literature, although it
has never been directly embraced by the Supreme Court. See Pfander, supra
note 43, at 647–48 (2004). See also Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197, 226–28; Richard B. Saphire and Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV.
85, 88, 138–39 (1988).
51. The most thorough textual defense of this approach was offered by
Professor James Pfander. See Pfander, supra note 43, at 647–48.
52. Id. at 653.
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Article III appellate review over any non-Article III tribunals
ruling on matters otherwise within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
B.

INTERNATIONAL COURTS: SLAVE-TRADE TRIBUNALS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT PRECEDENTS

Although Article III has not been invoked in any recent
decision involving international courts, the idea that Article III
could limit U.S. involvement in international tribunals has a
long historical pedigree. Thanks to recent research by Professor
Eugene Kontorovich,53 it is now clear that leading statesmen
and U.S. government negotiators considered Article III a
meaningful constitutional limitation when the United States
considered joining two international courts during the
nineteenth century.
First, as Professor Kontorovich details, Article III objections
played a key role in the U.S. rejection of an 1818 proposal from
Great Britain inviting the U.S. to join an international
commission to punish slave traders. Such a commission, which
several other countries had already agreed to join, would have
established a trial of slave traders by two commissioners—only
one of which held the same nationality as the accused. Sitting as
an international tribunal, the commission could also seek an
additional commissioner, from a third country, to resolve
deadlocks.
President James Monroe’s cabinet considered and rejected
the British invitation. The reasons for non-participation were
varied, but constitutional obstacles were a central motivation.
According to various sources, the “opinion was unanimous . . .
that it would be repugnant to the article in the Constitution
concerning the organization of the judicial power.”54
Although history is complicated and there are good reasons
to think other issues played an important role in the U.S.
government’s initial decision to reject the tribunals, key figures
such as John Quincy Adams invested substantial effort outlining
the constitutional difficulties with U.S. participation. In
correspondence, Adams argued that the slave-trade tribunals
53. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The
Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 42 (2009).
54. Id. at 51 (citing MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING
PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 217 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1875)).
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were constitutionally questionable because Congress could not
create courts “irresponsible to the supreme corrective tribunal of
the American Union.”55 In other words, Article III required at
least appellate review of a non-Article III tribunal’s decision, and
no such review existed in the British proposal.
The precedential value of these early constitutional
objections is limited due to a Civil War reversal by the U.S. In
finally joining the treaty in 1862, the U.S. seemed to jettison
decades
of
opposition
and
constitutional
concerns.
Constitutional objections may also have been allayed by a
decision to limit jurisdiction to vessels, excluding crews.56
Moreover, the highly delicate nature of Anglo-American
relations during the first years of the Civil War may also have
played a role in the U.S. government’s reversal.57 In any event,
it is still noteworthy that Article III objections to joining the
tribunals were seriously considered and prevailed for many
decades.
It is thus not surprising that similar Article III arguments
were raised again more than a generation later against U.S.
participation in another international maritime court—the
International Prize Court (IPC). Arising out of the Hague
Conference of 1907, the IPC was established to hear appeals by
various private parties of prize condemnations or decisions made
by national courts. It was thought that the new IPC would apply
international prize law more consistently and neutrally than
diverse national courts.
Since the IPC would have the power to review and reverse
prize decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, serious Article III
doubts were raised during consideration by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.58 Similar doubts were expressed by the
55. See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (June 24,
1823), in WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1820−1823, at 500 (New York, The
Macmillan Company 1917) (objecting that the commissions would be “under no
subordination to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country”); Letter from
John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush (Nov. 2, 1818), in
LETTERS FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR 88 (Washington, Galks & Seaton 1823)
(noting that the tribunal would be unacceptable because it would “decid[e] upon
the statutes of the United States without appeal”).
56. WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 55, at 500.
57. Kontorovich, supra note 53, at 42.
58. See George A. Finch, Appellate Jurisdiction in International Cases, 43
AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 89 (1949) (noting that objections were raised by “eminent
judges and lawyers and in the Committee on Foreign Relations”). The U.S. legal
advisor to the Hague Delegation, James Brown Scott, acknowledged an Article
III constitutional difficulty with the appeal provision, at least under “a strict
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American delegation to the 1909 London Naval Conference, who
told other delegates that the U.S. Constitution does not allow
non-Article III courts to “have the effect of annulling the
decision” of Article III courts.59
Eventually, these constitutional doubts and objections
spurred President Taft’s decision to seek amendments to the
IPC. These amendments would have allowed the United States
to reserve to those provisions of the IPC allowing appeal of the
U.S. court prize decisions. Consequently, an appellant could
bring a separate IPC proceeding whose jurisdiction was limited
to claims against the U.S. government, as opposed to individual
U.S. citizens or vessels. Moreover, unlike the original IPC, the
amended treaty would have only authorized the court to award
damages, instead of broader authority to issue substantive
remedial orders.60
These historical episodes reflect the significance of Article
III as a limitation on U.S. participation in an international court.
Both episodes underscore potential objections grounded in the
question of final appellate review by a federal U.S. court. While
constitutional objections were also raised to the delegation of
judicial power over certain types of rights that one might
consider private rights, the main consistent constitutional
objection appears to have been the divestment of federal
appellate review.
C.

MEDELLÍN AND SANCHEZ-LLAMAS

Article III challenges were not directly raised in two recent
Supreme Court decisions considering the domestic effects of an
International Court of Justice order.61 As this section explains,
however, concerns over protecting the Article III power animates
the holdings of these important contemporary analyses of
international courts’ role in our domestic legal framework.
The origins of the Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas cases stem
from a series of lawsuits brought against the United States in
the International Court of Justice. The ICJ is an international
construction” of the Constitution. See James Brown Scott, The International
Court of Prize, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 314 (1911).
59. PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL CONFERENCE, BRITISH
PARL. PAP., MISC. NO. 5, at 222 (1909).
60. Kontorovich, supra note 53, at 115.
61. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006).
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court established by the United Nations Charter to resolve
disputes between states.62 Beginning in 1998, the United States
was the subject of three separate lawsuits before this tribunal
alleging U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR).63
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ratified by
the United States in 1969, represented the culmination of years
of negotiation between most countries in the world regarding the
rights and obligations of consular officials. Under the Vienna
Convention, a foreign national was granted the right to be
informed that he has the right to seek consular assistance if
arrested while travelling abroad.64 This right, and the related
obligation of the host government to notify the foreign national
of this right, was an innovation of the Vienna Convention.65
Additionally, the Vienna Convention obligated states to ensure
62. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 497.
63. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
64. Id. at art. 36(1).
65. Communication and Conduct with Nationals of the Sending State:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending
State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with
and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They
shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who
is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking
action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if
he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Id. art. 36.
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its domestic laws conformed to these requirements. Article 36(2)
provided that:
The (notification) rights . . . shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article
are intended.
The Vienna Convention also contained an ‘Optional
Protocol’ stating that “disputes arising out of the interpretation
or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”66 This
provision gave the ICJ jurisdiction to resolve disputes between
states under the Vienna Convention.
Creative lawyers used the combination of Article 36(2) and
the Optional Protocol to challenge the convictions and capital
sentences of certain foreign nationals in the United States.
Discovering that most U.S. jurisdictions, especially state and
local law enforcement, failed to comply with Article 36 when
detaining and arresting foreign nationals, lawyers for foreign
nationals began to invoke Article 36 in post-conviction habeas
corpus proceedings, as well as during trials and direct appeals of
capital convictions.67
Most U.S. courts rejected the invocation of Article 36 in
habeas proceedings holding that such claims were “defaulted”
due to the failure of defendants to raise those claims at their
trials.68 Other U.S. courts rejected the use of Article 36 during
trials (or appeals of convictions) holding that this provision of
the VCCR was either non-self-executing or should be interpreted
to conform to state and federal law.69
The unwillingness of U.S. courts to use the VCCR to delay
or block the implementation of capital sentences did not settle
the matter, however. The Optional Protocol opened the door for
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 63, at art. 1 (citing the Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes).
67. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 617, 620–21, 623 (2008).
68. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998); Medellín v. Dreke,
371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 300–01 (5th
Cir. 1999).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.2d 192, 197 (5th Cir.
2001).
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foreign states to bring disputes about the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 to the International Court of
Justice. In a series of remarkable cases, three nations challenged
the U.S. for its failure to give suitable judicial remedies under
Article 36.
Paraguay and Germany brought actions on an emergency
basis because their foreign nationals were facing imminent
execution in Virginia and Arizona respectively. Though the ICJ
issued “provisional measures” calling on the U.S. to take all
measures to preserve the case on the merits, i.e., stopping the
executions,70 the U.S. Supreme Court did not give a definitive
order to execute the ICJ judgment. While the U.S. State
Department did call upon Virginia and Arizona to consider the
ICJ’s provisional measures judgment, neither state changed
course.71 The Supreme Court explicitly refused to act in the first
Paraguay case, citing concerns as to whether the provisional
measures order was binding and whether other federal laws
governing post-conviction habeas challenges superseded its
domestic effect.72
Mexico was the third state to invoke the VCCR and the
Optional Protocol. Unlike the first two cases, Mexico’s action was
not brought on an expedited basis, but sought a full hearing at
the ICJ on the proper implementation of Article 36 by the United
States in the context of foreign nationals facing capital
punishment. After full briefing and arguments presented by
both the United States and Mexico, the ICJ held that the U.S.
must provide a judicial remedy to evaluate the effects of
violations of Article 36 in post-conviction proceedings by capital
defendants.73 The Avena ruling therefore squarely put the ICJ
at odds with most U.S. judicial (and executive) interpretations
of Article 36.
The Avena decision sparked a new round of U.S. litigation

70. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Ger. v. United States of America)
(Mar.
3,
1999),
http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/?pr=350&p1=3&p2=3
&p3=6&case=104; Press Release, International Court of Justice, Case
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States
of
America)
(Apr.
9,
1998),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/index.php?pr=322&code=paus&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=99&k=08.
71. See Stephanie Baker, Germany v. United States in the International
Court of Justice, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277, 289 (2002).
72. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. See also Levit, supra note 67, at 620 n.18.
73. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States of
America), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31, 2004).
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by foreign nationals seeking adoption of the Avena court’s
interpretation of Article 36. Instead of only relying on Article 36,
the new litigation directly invoked the authority of the ICJ over
the proper interpretation of the Vienna Convention by virtue of
the Optional Protocol.74 Eventually, the Supreme Court
considered the effect of Avena in two separate decisions. The
first, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, involved a direct challenge to a
non-capital conviction based on violation of Article 36 against a
Honduran national.75 The second, Medellín v. Texas, involved a
post-conviction habeas action seeking (per Avena) a judicial
hearing to consider the effects of the Article 36 violation on the
Mexican defendants’ conviction and capital sentence.76 In both
cases, the effect of the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 was
central to the petitioner’s arguments. Both decisions reflected
substantial constitutional discomfort with giving too much
weight or force to the ICJ’s interpretation and orders.
1. Sanchez-Llamas
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court agreed to consider
three issues: (1) whether Article 36 created an individual right;
(2) whether violation of this right required suppression of
evidence collected in violation of this right; and (3) whether posthabeas challenges based on Article 36 were subject to state law
“procedural default” provisions requiring such claims to be
raised at trial.77 The Court, by a 6-3 majority, held that no
suppression remedy could be required by Article 36 and that
Article 36 claims were subject to the procedural default rule. The
Court assumed for the purposes of the decision but did not
decide, that the VCCR created individual rights.78
The Court’s holding that Article 36 does not require
suspension conflicted directly with the ICJ’s interpretation in
Avena. The Court was aware of this conflict, but offered two
reasons why it did not have to follow the ICJ.
First, under the terms of the ICJ Statute, the decisions of
the ICJ have “no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case.”79 The petitioner in Sanchez74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
548 U.S. 331 (2006).
522 U.S. 491 (2008).
548 U.S. at 331.
See id.
ICJ Statute art. 59. See also Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354.
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Llamas was not a Mexican national, and consequently, the
Avena decision did not bind the United States outside of the
Mexican context.
Second, the Court rejected arguments by amici arguing that
“the United States is obligated to comply with the [VCCR], as
interpreted by the ICJ.”80 Flatly disagreeing, the Court instead
announced that ICJ decisions would receive only “respectful
consideration.”81 Not only was the ICJ decision not binding in
this particular case, but “[U]nder our Constitution, ‘the judicial
Power of the United States is vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.’”82 This “judicial Power . . . extend[ed]
to . . . Treaties,”83 and, as Chief Justice Marshall famously
explained, “that judicial power includes the duty ‘to say what the
law is.’”84 Consequently, if treaties are to be given effect as
federal law, determining their meaning as a matter of federal
law “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department,” headed by the “one supreme Court” established by
the Constitution.85
After citing authority for its own supremacy in the
interpretation of treaties, the Court went on to argue that
nothing in the United Nations Charter, the ICJ Statute, nor the
VCCR’s Optional Protocol suggested that the ICJ’s decisions
were intended to bind federal courts or the Supreme Court in its
interpretation of treaties.86 Additionally, nothing in the history
of Senate ratification of the U.N. Charter or the Optional
Protocol suggested otherwise.87
2. Medellín v. Texas
At the same time that non-Mexican defendants sought to
apply the ICJ’s interpretation, Mexican defendants also sought
Supreme Court review. Unlike the defendants in SanchezLlamas, Mexican defendants facing capital sentences were the
80. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54.
81. Id. at 355–56.
82. Id. at 353 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
83. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
84. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
85. Id. at 353–54.
86. Id. at 354 (stating that the Charter “contemplates quintessentially
international remedies” for non-compliance) (emphasis original).
87. Id.
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actual subjects of the ICJ’s decision in Avena. There was no
doubt, therefore, that the ICJ’s decision in Avena was intended
to be binding on the United States with respect to the Mexican
defendants.88 Jose Medellín, a Mexican national facing a death
sentence in Texas, brought the first Avena-related action.
Medellín’s initial trip to the Supreme Court was delayed
when President Bush issued a memorandum stating that state
courts should give effect to the ICJ’s Avena decision out of
“comity.”89 The Court sent Medellín back to Texas courts to
litigate the effect of the presidential memorandum.90 When
Texas courts failed to give effect to either the ICJ’s decision or
the Presidential memorandum, Medellín returned to the
Supreme Court arguing that the Court was obligated to give
effect to the Avena-interpretation of Article 36 and allow a
judicial hearing for Article 36 claims.91
This time, the Supreme Court allowed Medellín to present
his argument on the merits—that the ICJ’s decision in Avena
required the Supreme Court to change its interpretation of
Article 36 because the ICJ’s decision was directly enforceable in
U.S. law. After analyzing the text of the Optional Protocol and
the U.N. Charter provision setting out the U.S. government’s
obligation to comply with ICJ judgments, the Court held that the
ICJ judgment was not directly enforceable.92 In large part, the
Court relied on its reading of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter,
which requires United Nations member states to “undertake to
comply” with judgments of the ICJ.93 The Court held that this
language could not create a direct domestically enforceable
obligation when read in the context of the larger structure of the
Charter for the enforcement of obligations through the Security
Council.94 Indeed, the Court went so far as to express discomfort
with the consequences of Medellín’s interpretation, noting that:
Moreover, the consequences of Medellín’s argument give
pause. An ICJ judgment, the argument goes, is not only

88. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States of
America), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31, 2004) (finding 14-1 that United States
“breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36”).
89. Medellín, 522 U.S. at 498, 504.
90. See id. at 503.
91. Id. at 504.
92. Id. at 517.
93. U.N. Charter art. 94.
94. See Medellín, 522 U.S. at 505.
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binding domestic law but is also unassailable. As a
result, neither Texas nor this Court may look behind a
judgment and quarrel with its reasoning or result.95
Medellín’s interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to
override otherwise binding state law; there is nothing in
his logic that would exempt contrary federal law from the
same fate. And there is nothing to prevent the ICJ from
ordering state courts to annul criminal convictions and
sentences, for any reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ.96

Curiously, the Court does not fully explain why the
“consequences” of Medellín’s argument “give pause.” The Court
states what it finds an obviously problematic result—“ICJ
judgments . . . overrid[ing] otherwise binding” law or even
“annull[ing] criminal convictions and sentences.”97 In the next
paragraph, the majority drew attention to the fact that the
dissent was also uncomfortable with this result since it seemed
to interfere with the role of the political branches in conducting
foreign affairs.98 However, the Court did not fully divulge the
sources of its discomfort with Medellín’s preferred result.99
Read together with Sanchez-Llamas, nevertheless, it is
likely that one source of discomfort is the tension between the
petitioners’ arguments and the Court’s designation of itself as
the supreme arbiter of federal law. Therefore, the likely, but
unstated reason that the Court was “given pause” was the notion
that the Court’s own interpretation of Article 36 must be
reversed as a result of the ICJ’s interpretation.
To be sure, there is reason to doubt that the Court was ready
to announce a rule preventing the enforcement of an
international court judgment. As the Court acknowledged in
Medellín, “We do not suggest that treaties can never afford
binding domestic effect to international tribunal judgments—
only that the U.N. Charter, the Optional Protocol, and the ICJ
Statute do not do so.”100
However, the Court also rejected arguments that the

95. We already know, from Sanchez-Llamas, that this Court disagrees with
both the reasoning and result in Avena.
96. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18.
97. Id. at 518.
98. See id. at 565–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
decision “unnecessarily complicate[d] the President’s foreign affairs task.”).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 519.
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enforcement of an international tribunal judgment could be
analogized to routine enforcement of a foreign court judgment.
To the contrary, the Court noted that “the general rule . . . is that
judgments of foreign courts awarding injunctive relief, even as
to private parties, let alone sovereign States, ‘are not generally
entitled to enforcement.’”101
In so many words, the Court emphasized the extraordinary
nature of the rule that Medellín was seeking to have the court
adopt. The Supreme Court was being asked to give automatic
enforcement—the equivalent of injunctive relief against a
sovereign state on a matter of public policy—to a judgment of an
international court. The Court’s narrow reading of the relevant
treaties seemed influenced by its discomfort with Medellín’s
claimed-for rule.
3. Summary
Although neither Sanchez-Llamas nor Medellín drew a
constitutional ‘red line’ against giving international courts’
judgments broad effect within the U.S. system, both decisions
found a way to avoid giving the ICJ any automatic legal force
within the United States. The caution and “pause” that
characterized both decisions has a deeper historical pedigree
than was generally acknowledged. Through avoiding
foundational Article III objections, the Court was able to dodge
issues that will reoccur in the future. In the next Part, this Essay
will argue that the Law of the Sea’s Dispute Settlement system
will present a far less avoidable clash with Article III than the
treaties that served as the basis for Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellín.
IV. ARTICLE III AND UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The UNCLOS Dispute Settlement system has two
provisions which create potential constitutional conflicts with
federal judicial power. First, like the ICJ provisions considered
in Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín, UNCLOS mandates that all
states-parties comply with the decision of any UNCLOS court or
tribunal that holds jurisdiction over a particular dispute.102
101. Id. at 522 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
481 cmt. b.).
102. See UNCLOS art. 296.

OF THE U.S. §

22

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 25:1

Second, UNCLOS mandates that the judgments of the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber be given automatic direct enforcement by
U.S. courts without national appellate review.103 Each of these
provisions present clear Article III difficulties that will be more
challenging to avoid than the provisions considered in the ICJ
cases.
A. UNCLOS BINDING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
As discussed in Part II supra, UNCLOS creates a
complicated system of dispute settlement that requires states
parties to agree to binding adjudication of disputes under the
Convention. Although the parties have choices as to which kind
of dispute settlement to agree to, UNCLOS makes clear that all
forms of dispute settlement create binding obligations among
the parties. Article 296 states, “Any decision rendered by a court
or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final
and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute.”104
It is worth comparing the language of this provision to
Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, which was the main
basis for the attempt to enforce the ICJ Avena decision in U.S.
law:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to
give effect to the judgment.105
As discussed above, the Medellín Court emphasized that the
phrase “undertakes to comply” did not necessarily denote
immediate enforcement of an ICJ judgment.106 When combined
with Article 94(2)’s provision for “recourse to the Security

103.
104.
105.
106.

See UNCLOS art. 187.
UNCLOS art. 296.
U.N. Charter art. 94.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517.
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Council,” the Medellín Court found that there was no reason to
think domestic courts had an obligation to enforce decisions
automatically.107
Unlike Article 94 of the UN Charter, Article 296 of UNCLOS
uses the phrases “final” and “shall be complied with by all
parties to the dispute.”108 This direct language, along with the
lack of a Security Council “enforcement” provision analogous to
Article 94(2), would make it much more problematic for the
Supreme Court to interpret Article 296 to avoid an Article III
quandary.109
Indeed, the “final” and “shall be complied with” language is
not only exacting, but it is also much more binding than other
international tribunals to which the U.S. belongs. For example,
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has the power to order “recommendations” for how a
party in violation of the various WTO agreements must bring its
laws and regulations “into conformity with that agreement.”110
Indeed, it is clear under U.S. law that the judgments of the WTO
dispute settlement body have no direct effect on judgments of
U.S. courts, although they are typically implemented by new
congressional legislation or administrative rulemaking.111
In contrast, a United States court considering the legality of
a detained vessel would note that it is bound to “comply” with an
order from a UNCLOS tribunal for the prompt release of that
vessel. The obligation to comply with the UNCLOS tribunal
order has no exceptions and would not allow review by federal
courts—i.e., the word “final” suggests no further appeal or
review is permitted.112
107. Id. (citing U.N. Charter art. 94).
108. UNCLOS art. 296.
109. See ICJ Statute art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); id. at art.
60 (“The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the
meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request
of any party.”).
110. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, annex II, art. 19.
111. It is worth noting that even the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court (which the U.S. has not ratified) does not contain
language as direct as UNCLOS. Under Article 87 of Rome Statute, the ICC may
make a finding of non-compliance of a member state, after which it “may” refer
the matter to the Assembly of State Parties or to the Security Council. Rome
Statute to the ICC, art. 87(7). Any other dispute between ICC member states is
also referred to the Assembly for further action. See Rome Statute art. 119(2).
112. See UNCLOS art. 296.
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As discussed supra, this creates tension with Article III,
especially since UNCLOS tribunals hold jurisdiction over
matters as diverse as fishing practices, actions on the high seas,
scientific research of the marine environment, and intrusions
into territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. While most
would likely involve public rights, it is also possible that private
rights could be implicated in UNCLOS arbitral proceedings.
UNCLOS requires states-parties to submit any disputes
“concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention”
to UNCLOS dispute settlement.113 Private activities with
respect to fishing, undersea resources extraction, or scientific
research (among others) could fall within a UNCLOS
proceeding. Since all matters would involve the interpretation of
UNCLOS, federal courts would ordinarily have the judicial
power over the interpretation of the treaty. Article 296’s clear
designation of all UNCLOS tribunal decisions as “final”
arguably precludes reserving such powers to the U.S. courts. At
the very least, the Supreme Court would strain to find a narrow
interpretation of the phrase “final . . . decision” in a way that
would reserve final review in federal courts.
Even if one re-framed a UNCLOS award or judgment as
analogous to a foreign court judgment, the “finality” obligation
under UNCLOS seems substantially more onerous than that
imposed by a foreign court judgment. Although U.S. courts
routinely enforce judgments of foreign courts, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that such enforcement is made out of
comity rather than binding obligation toward those foreign
courts.114 Indeed, it is not even clear that the law governing the
enforcement of foreign judgments is federal as opposed to a
matter of individual state common law. In any event, most
American federal and state courts will refuse to enforce foreign
judgments that lack “due process” or which violate other public
policy of the forum.115 This admittedly limited review is still
more than what would seem to be required by a UNCLOS
judgment.

113. UNCLOS art. 286.
114. See Hilton v. Guvot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
115. Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 158 (2013) (noting that most federal
and state courts will follow a comity-type standard when considering foreign
judgments).
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SEA-BED DISPUTES CHAMBER

The constitutional conflict with the UNCLOS Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber is even more pronounced. As discussed in
Part II, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber holds exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes involving the sea-bed outside of
national jurisdictions. As a tribunal under Article 296, statesparties must also comply with the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber’s
decisions. UNCLOS goes further and demands that “[t]he
decisions of the Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories
of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders
of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the
enforcement is sought.”116
The language of this provision is much more unequivocally
in conflict with the U.S. Constitution’s Article III’s requirement
of appellate review of any non-Article III tribunal. By the plain
terms of Annex VI, Article 39, there is no possibility of any
domestic court questioning or reviewing a decision of the SeaBed Disputes Chamber.117 Any such decisions must be given
automatic enforcement “in the same manner” as judgments of
the “highest court of the State Party in whose territory the
enforcement is sought.”118 That “highest court” would be the
United States Supreme Court.
The removal of appellate review appears to be a serious
problem under Article III. By explicitly removing this possibility,
UNCLOS has squarely presented a constitutional challenge of
the same kind that troubled U.S. decision makers in the slavetrade tribunal and International Prize Court contexts.
Compounding the difficulties, the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber, unlike the other UNCLOS tribunals, holds
jurisdiction over private parties and individuals in any legal
disputes with states-parties or the Authority managing the seabed.119 In other words, it is almost certain, given the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chambers’ jurisdiction over contract interpretation
and similar matters that private rather than public rights will
be subject to adjudication. The fact that private individual rights
are at stake in Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber matters only
heightens the Article III difficulty created by this unique

116.
117.
118.
119.

UNCLOS, annex VI, art. 39.
Id.
Id.
See UNCLOS art. 187.
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institution.
V.

CONCLUSION: NON-COMPLIANCE OR
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

It bears emphasizing that the constitutional difficulties
facing the participation of the United States in UNCLOS are not
necessarily fatal to U.S. participation. As John Yoo and I have
argued elsewhere, treating all such provisions as non-selfexecuting can mitigate many of the Article III tensions identified
in Part III by giving Congress the duty to determine how and
whether the U.S. will comply with UNCLOS tribunal
judgments.120 Moreover, the U.S. is already a participant in at
least one dispute resolution system, which also calls for
automatic non-appealable enforcement—the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).121
Although no such enforcement action has ever been brought
under the ICSID in the U.S., the fact that the U.S. has long been
a part of ICSID suggests that Congress and the President may
not be troubled by the Article III implications of this
arrangement.
As discussed supra, however, the Medellín and SanchezLlamas decisions should prompt a second look at the legality of
U.S. participation in international tribunals. In particular, the
removal of appellate review poses a serious challenge to the
supremacy of federal courts required by Article III. Unless
Congress deviates from UNCLOS when it enacts a statute
implementing this agreement, the United States is faced with
the prospect of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber adjudicating
private rights without any possibility of appellate review by the
Supreme Court. On a lesser scale, Americans could also be faced
with ITLOS provisional measures orders and UNCLOS arbitral
awards that are “final” and binding on U.S. federal courts.
The United States government appears to be planning to
delay and postpone the constitutional question as long as

120. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 87–101 (2012).
121. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) (2015) (“An award of an arbitral tribunal
rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes] shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United
States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced
and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.”).
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possible. In its analysis of UNCLOS for the Senate, the U.S.
State Department declared that it would treat UNCLOS as a
whole and the Seabed Disputes Chamber provisions, in
particular, as “non-self-executing.”122 This approach only
postpones rather than resolves the constitutional issue. By
acceding to the treaty, the U.S. takes on a clear and specific
obligation to comply with UNCLOS awards and to give Seabed
Disputes Chamber judgments the effect of its “highest court.”
Moreover, the legal status of ITLOS provisional measures
awards or UNCLOS arbitration awards are not directly
discussed by the State Department’s analysis.
The plan, therefore, appears to be that the U.S. will join
UNCLOS at some point without enacting legislation to carry out
its settlement obligations. If the U.S. simply refuses to execute
those dispute settlement obligations, it would be in violation of
its obligations under UNCLOS and would be subject to criticism
and sanctions from states-parties to UNCLOS. Thus, if the U.S.
joins UNCLOS, the country will be under pressure to implement
its dispute settlement obligations via legislation.
The U.S. will likely face a dilemma—enacting legislation to
give direct effect to UNCLOS awards and orders, or avoiding the
constitutional difficulties by refusing to comply with its
UNCLOS dispute settlement obligations. The latter path is how
the U.S. proceeded in the Medellín ICJ cases and it is the likely
strategy if the U.S. joins UNCLOS.
The goal of this Essay was to establish that constitutional
objections to joining UNCLOS with respect to dispute settlement
are far from frivolous and are a serious impediment to
participation. Even if it is a surmountable obstacle that the
United States will solve by simply refusing to carry out its
international obligations, it is an obstacle that needs to be taken
seriously by both sides of the debate over ratification.
Simply joining the Convention with the intention of noncompliance is disrespectful of both UNCLOS and the other
member states of the treaty. Instead, the U.S. should make clear
upon its accession that the U.S. will interpret both UNCLOS
dispute settlement provisions to be consistent with the U.S.
Constitution. It has made similar interpretive declarations upon
joining the U.N. human rights treaties and it has even limited
the effect of a treaty’s dispute resolution provision by such a
122. See Senate Exec. Doc. 110-09, supra note 9, at 2–3 (asserting that
“[b]ecause of potential constitutional concerns,” Senate advice and consent
would likely be conditioned on limiting direct effect of certain provisions).
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declaration. For example, when the U.S. joined the International
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), the U.S. declared that it would treat
that treaty’s binding dispute resolution provisions as requiring
its “specific intent” before any action could be brought to the
ICJ.123 Even though no other country has adopted such an
interpretation of the Convention, the U.S. was able to join the
treaty.
Similarly, the U.S. limitation on UNCLOS dispute
settlement could do no more than simply declare that it reads
both UNCLOS dispute settlement obligations to be non-selfexecuting, as the U.S. government currently proposes. Rather, it
could add a declaration that it reads Articles 287 and 296 to be
consistent with the supremacy of the federal judicial power
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, any
implementing legislation would further clarify that before any
UNCLOS judgments are found binding on the U.S., they are
subject to final review by the U.S. Supreme Court consistent
with Article III. This approach would thus allow the U.S. to join
UNCLOS but signal to other members that there are limitations
on its participation as a result of the U.S. Constitution.
UNCLOS may or may not be worth joining. There are good
arguments on both sides. But the constitutional problems with
U.S. accession has been largely ignored or glossed over by the
legal academy. This Essay has identified a real constitutional
conflict between Article III and the dispute resolution provisions
of UNCLOS. It has also suggested a possible way to overcome
the conflict that is superior to the current U.S. approach.

123 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
(“That with reference to article 22 of the Convention, before any dispute to
which the United States is a party may be substituted to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the
United States is required in each case.”), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.

